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Case No. 20080377-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
KIDUS YOHANNES, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for unlawful acquisition, possession, 
or transfer of a financial transaction card. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the evidence suffice to support defendant's conviction? 
Standard of Review. Review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
"is highly deferential to a jury verdict.,/ State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, % 29, 122 
P.3d 639. This Court will review "the evidence and all inferences which may be 
reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict." Id. After 
reviewing the evidence in this light, the Court "will reverse a jury verdict for 
insufficient evidence only if [it] determine [s] that reasonable minds could not 
have reached the verdict." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes are reproduced in Addendum A.-
Utah Code § 76-6-506.2 (2007), and 
Utah Code § 76-6-506.3 (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with unlawful possession of a debit card 
belonging to his roommate, Sam Westfahl, a third degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code § 76-6-506.3 (2003). R12. At the close of the State's case at trial, 
defendant moved for a directed verdict, claiming there was "insufficient evidence 
for a reasonable jury to conclude that [defendant] was in possession of a credit 
card with intent to use/7 R149:145. The trial court denied defendant's motion, 
R149:149, and a jury found defendant guilty, R135. The trial court sentenced 
defendant to an indeterminate prison term not to exceed five years, suspended 
that term, and imposed a 120-day jail term and probation. Rl44-45. 
Defendant timely appealed.1 
The district court record includes no notice of appeal. However, the court 
of appeals received a certified copy of the notice of appeal bearing a Fourth 
District Court date stamp of April 21, 2008 (reproduced in Addendum B). 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant lived in an Orem, Utah home with three roommates. R149:113. 
One of the roommates was Sam Westf ahl, who shared a bedroom with defendant. 
Id. At the time of the offense, they had lived together for a little more than a 
month. Id. Sam said that he and defendant "never connected" and that their 
relationship was "strained/' R149:114. Defendant was "odd," "standoffish[,] and 
not approachable." R149:114, 126-27. He spent five to ten hours a day on the 
Internet, accessing sites that caused Sam concern. R149:119,127. 
In early June 2007, defendant apparently found that someone had 
vandalized his computer, cutting the wires to the switch inside the case. 
R149:106. A computer technician estimated the cost of repairing the computer at 
$100. Id. Sometime on or before June 4, defendant told another roommate that 
Sam had caused the damage. R149:120. Defendant expressed anger and hostility 
toward Sam. See R149:121, 123. On June 4, defendant took his computer to the 
police station, told police that someone had cut the wires to the switch, told police 
it would cost $100 to repair it, and accused Sam. R149:105,207-08. Sam testified at 
trial that he did not vandalize the computer. R149:120. 
The next day, defendant could not find his car key. R149:121. He "came 
upstairs," "visibly upset" and " enraged," and accused Sam of taking the key. Id. 
Although Sam told him repeatedly that he did not have the key, defendant kept 
3 
pressuring Sam. Id. Defendant said that "he had to get to work so he had to have 
a key" and that "he was going to call a locksmith to have a new key made, and it 
was going to cost him a lot of money." Id. The key was located a day or two later. 
R149:121-22. Sam and another roommate found it in an open bag belonging to 
defendant. R149:122. Sam testified that he did not take the key. R149:125. 
On June 4 or 5, Sam noticed that his First Interstate debit card was missing. 
R149:115. Sam normally kept it in his room, in a drawer or on top of the cabinet. 
R149:116. Sam thought he had lost or misplaced it. R149:129. He checked with 
the bank to make sure that it had not been used. Id. On June 7, when he still 
could not find the card, he called the bank to report that it was missing. R149:129. 
That night, Sam called the police. R149:129-30. His purpose in calling was 
not to report the missing debit card, but to talk with the police about some things 
defendant was doing that Sam felt were suspicious.2 See R149:30. Police met Sam, 
2
 According to the prosecutor, Sam had "suspicions and red flags because of 
the stuff he observed [defendant accessing] on the internet—violence towards 
police officers, violence towards military personnel, Arabic websites and so 
forth." R149:142. The prosecutor argued that defense counsel's questioning had 
opened the door as to these matters and that the jury should be able to hear about 
what Sam had observed, but the trial judge disagreed. R149:142 (record of sidebar 
discussion). 
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and he reported his observations. Id. He did not say anything about the debit 
card. Id. 
The following day police executed a search warrant permitting them to 
search defendant's personal belongings. R149:92. While police were searching 
defendant's belongings at the residence, Sam told them about the missing debit 
card. R149:130. 
The warrant also authorized police to search defendant's vehicle. R149:92. 
Because they had received information that defendant's car was not parked 
directly in front of his home, police looked for the car in "the south end of town." 
R149:93. They located the locked car about seven blocks southwest of defendant's 
residence. R149:94-95. Using a "slim jim," the officers unlocked the car and 
opened a door. R149:99. During the search they found "a debit card with the 
name of Sam Westfahl" in the glove compartment. R149:96.3 
Sam testified that he had never been in defendant's car and had never had 
access to it. R149:134. 
The debit card had not been used while it was missing. R149:136. 
3
 The police also found several AK-47 assault rifle magazines in defendant's 
belongings and in his car, along with a large quantity of ammunition and other 
weapons parts. Rl. 
5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence sufficed to show that defendant had acquired and was in 
constructive possession of Sam's debit card when it was found. The card was 
found in the glove compartment of defendant's car, which had been locked and 
parked seven blocks away from defendant's residence. Moreover, defendant had 
access to the card, which Sam kept in the room they shared, and defendant 
believed that Sam owed him $100. 
The evidence also sufficed to show that defendant possessed the card with 
the intent to unlawfully use it. Defendant had taken the card after accusing Sam 
of vandalizing his computer, expressing rage at what he believed Sam had done, 
and blaming Sam for $100 in damages. The jury could reasonably have inferred 
that he took the card to pay for the costs for which he believed Sam was 
responsible. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION 
A person is guilty of unlawful acquisition or possession of a financial 
transaction card if he acquires a card "from another without the consent of the 
card holder" or if he "retains possession" of a lost or mislaid card, with the intent 
to use it "to defraud, obtain or attempt to obtain credit or purchase or attempt to 
purchase goods, property, or services." Utah Code § 76-6-506.2 (2007) & § 76-6-
506.3 (2003). 
Defendant claims that "the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt" that he committed the offense. Br. Appellant at 9. He does not 
argue that he had consent to take the card. See id. at 9-18. Rather, he claims that 
the State failed to prove his "constructive possession" of the card, id. at 12-16, or 
his intent to unlawfully use it, id. at 16-18. 
A. The evidence sufficed to show defendant's constructive 
possession of the card. 
Constructive possession. Sometimes a defendant is found in actual 
possession of prohibited items—he may have stolen goods or controlled 
substances on his person. At other times, such items may be found in some 
proximity to a defendant or in a location to which he has access. For instance, 
sometimes drugs may be found in a car in a location where any of several 
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occupants, including the defendant, may have placed them. See State v. Ferry, 2007 
UT App 128, 163 P.3d 647. Sometimes they may be found in a room or home 
shared by the defendant and one or more other individuals. See State v. Workman, 
2005 UT 66,122 P.3d 639. Sometimes they may be found on another person who 
has some connection with the defendant. See State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79,985 P.2d 
911. 
Where a defendant is found in proximity to, but not in actual physical 
possession of drugs or stolen goods, the State must establish constructive 
possession, that is, it must show that there is "a sufficient nexus between the 
accused and the drugs [or stolen property] to permit an inference that the accused 
had both the power and the intent to exercise control over the drugs [or stolen 
property]/' Id. at Tf 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[T]he 
existence of a sufficient nexus to prove constructive possession is a highly fact-
sensitive determination." Id. at ^ 14. 
While no list of factors is always relevant, several of the following factors 
may be useful in determining whether a sufficient nexus exists: (1) "ownership 
and/or occupancy . . . of the vehicle where the [stolen property] w[as] found/' (2) 
"presence of a defendant at the time the [the property] w[as] found/' (3) a 
"defendant's proximity to the [property]/' (4) a defendant's "incriminating 
statements or behavior," and (5) "presence of [property] in a specific area where 
8 
the defendant had control." State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 32,122 P.3d 639 (citing 
State v. Anderson, 668 P.2d 1258,1264 (Utah 1983)). Even where a relevant factor 
does not by itself establish a sufficient nexus between a defendant and the stolen 
property, the cumulative effect of multiple factors can. See Workman, 2005 UT 66, 
135. 
Analysis. Here, the State presented evidence to show that there was "a 
sufficient nexus" between defendant and the financial transaction card "to permit 
an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise 
control" over the card.4 Layman, 1999 UT 79, 113. First, the card was found in 
defendant's locked car. R149:94. The vehicle had been parked seven blocks from 
defendant's residence, R149:95, suggesting some attempt to keep its location 
secret. Nothing in the record suggests that any person other than defendant had 
access to and control over the car, and Sam testified that he had never been in the 
car or had access to it. R149:134. Second, defendant had access to the debit card, 
which Sam kept in the room he shared with defendant. R149:113, 116. Third, 
defendant had accused Sam of vandalizing his computer, indirectly stating that 
4
 The State also presented Sam's testimony that he never gave defendant 
permission to possess or use his debit card. R149:124. 
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Sam was the person who had caused damages to the computer amounting to $100. 
R149:106, 120. Defendant had expressed anger and hostility toward Sam. 
Rl49:121 (defendant was "enraged" when he accused Sam of taking his car key), 
123 (defendant glared at defendant and gave him "the silent treatment" after 
accusing him of vandalizing the computer). Defendant's statements could 
reasonably be found to be incriminating in the context of this case because they 
suggest that defendant believed that Sam had wronged him and could support an 
inference that he took the card to pay the cost of repairs for which he believed 
Sam was responsible. 
The testimony of these matters was sufficient to permit the jury to draw an 
inference that defendant had both the power and intent to exercise control over 
the debit card. 
B. The evidence sufficed to show that defendant intended to 
unlawfully use the card. 
The evidence also sufficed to support a jury finding that defendant 
intended to unlawfully use the card. "'[T]he intent to commit [an offense] is a 
state of mind, which is rarely susceptible of direct proof,. . . [but] can be inferred 
from conduct and attendant circumstances in the light of human behavior and 
experience/" State v. Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, f 15,122 P.3d 895 (quoting State 
v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1981); see also State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, If 43, 994 
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P.2d 177 ("[I]ntent to commit a crime may be inferred from the actions of the 
defendant or from surrounding circumstances/7) (additional quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
Here, the circumstantial evidence and the inferences that could reasonably 
be drawn from it were sufficient to support a jury finding that defendant 
intended to unlawfully use the card. Defendant had taken his computer to the 
police station in a nonfunctional condition, told police that someone had cut the 
wires to the on/off switch, told police that it would cost $100 to repair it, and 
accused Sam. R149:107-08. Defendant "suspected it wTas one of his roommates 
because they were the only ones that had access to the computer/7 but he focused 
on one. R94:108. Defendant"specifically kept mentioning Sam/7 R149:110. 
The following day, when defendant was unable to find his car key, he 
"came upstairs,77 "visibly upset77 and "actually enraged.77 R149:121. He again 
accused Sam. Id. Although Sam told him "over and over77 that he did not have 
the key, defendant kept pressuring Sam. Id. Defendant said that "he had to get 
to work so he had to have a key77 and that "he was going to call a locksmith to 
have a new key made, and it was going to cost him a lot of money/7 Id. 
Based on defendant's angry belief that Sam had damaged his computer and 
taken his car key, and based on defendant's focus on the costs associated with the 
computer damage and the loss of the key, the jury could reasonably have infeirred 
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that defendant took Sam's debit card intending to use it to pay for the costs of the 
computer damage and/or the costs of replacing the car key. As the prosecutor 
argued in closing, "In [defendant's] mind, Sam owed him $100." R149:180. 
In sum, the evidence sufficed to support the jury's finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant possessed Sam's debit card without Sam's 
consent and that he possessed it with the intent to unlawfully use it. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted May «?D , 2009. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JEANNE B. INOUYE 
assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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U T ST § 76-6-506.2 Page 11 
U.C.A. 1953 §76-6-506.2 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 6. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 
PART 5. FRAUD 
§ 76-6-506.2. Financial transaction card offenses—Unlawful use of card or 
automated banking device—False application for card 
It is unlawful for any person to: 
(1) knowingly, with intent to defraud, obtain or attempt to obtain credit or pur-
chase or attempt to purchase goods, property, or services, by the use of a false, 
fictitious, altered, counterfeit, revoked, expired, stolen, or fraudulently ob-
tained financial transaction card, by any financial transaction card credit number, 
personal identification code, or by the use of a financial transaction card not au-
thorized by the issuer or the card holder; 
(2) use a financial transaction card, with intent to defraud, to knowingly and 
willfully exceed the actual balance of a demand or time deposit account; 
(3) use a financial transaction card, with intent to defraud, to willfully exceed 
an authorized credit line by $500 or more, or by 50% of such line, whichever) is 
greater; 
(4) willfully, with intent to defraud, deposit into his or any other account by 
means of an automated banking device a false, fictitious, forged, altered, or coun-
terfeit check, draft, money order, or any other similar document; 
(5) make application for a financial transaction card to an issuer, while knowingly 
making or causing to be made a false statement or report relative to his name, oc-
cupation, financial condition, assets, or to willfully and substantially undervalue 
or understate any indebtedness for the purposes of influencing the issuer to, i,ssue 
the financial transaction card; or 
(6) knowingly, with intent to defraud any authorized credit card merchant, card 
holder, or issuer, sell or attempt to sell credit card sales drafts to an author-
ized credit card merchant or any other person or organization, for any considera-
tion whether at a discount or otherwise, or present or cause to be presented to the 
issuer or an authorized credit card merchant, for payment or collection, any such 
credit card sales draft, if: 
(a) the draft is counterfeit or fictitious; 
(b) the purported sales evidenced by any such credit card sales draft did riot take 
place; 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
UT ST § 76-6-506.2 
U.C.A. 1953 §76-6-506.2 
Page 2 
(c) the purported sale was not authorized by the card holder; 
(d) the items or services purported to be sold as evidenced by the credit card 
sales drafts are not delivered or rendered to the card holder or person intended 
to receive them; or 
(e) when delivered or rendered, the goods or services are materially different or 
of materially lesser value or quality than represented by the seller or his agent 
to the purchaser, or have substantial discrepancies from goods or services impli-
edly represented by the purchase price when compared with the actual goods or ser-
vices delivered or rendered. 
Laws 1983, c. 96, § 3; Laws 1991, c. 60, § 4; Laws 2007, c. 306, § 100, eff. 
April 30, 2007. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2007, c. 306, redesignated former subsecs. (6)(i) through (v) as subsecs. 
(6)(a) through (e). 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
WESTLAW 
U T ST § 76-6-506.3 Page l| 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-506.3 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 6. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 
PART 5. FRAUD 
§ 76-6-506.3. Financial transaction card offenses—Unlawful acquisition, pos-
session, or transfer of card 
Any person is guilty of a third degree felony who: 
(1) acquires a financial transaction card from another without the consent of the 
card holder or the issuer, or, with the knowledge that it has been acquired without 
consent, and with intent to use it in violation of Section 76-6- 506.2; 
(2) receives a financial transaction card with intent to use it in violation of 
Section 76-6-506.2; 
(3) sells or transfers a financial transaction card to another person with the| 
knowledge that it will be used in violation of Section 76-6-506.2; 
(4)(a) acquires a financial transaction card that the person knows was lost, mis-
laid, or delivered under a mistake as to the identity or address of the card 
holder; and 
(b)(i) retains possession with intent to use it in violation of Section 76- 6-
506.2; or 
(ii) sells or transfers a financial transaction card to another person with the 
knowledge that it will be used in violation of Section 76-6-506.2; or 
(5) possesses, sells, or transfers any information necessary for the use of a fi-
nancial transaction card, including the credit number of the card, the expiration 
date of the card, or the personal identification code related to the card: 
(a)(i) without the consent of the card holder or the issuer; or 
(ii) with the knowledge that the information has been acquired without consent 
of the card holder or the issuer; and 
(b) with intent to use the information in violation of Section 76-6-506.2. 
Laws 1983, c. 96, § 4; Laws 1997, c. 191, § 2, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2003, |c. 
306, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2003, c. 306, added subsec. (5). 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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